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REGULARIZATION of capital investment appears offhand to be a very
desirable management objective in the highly diversified and far-
flung building materials industry. Public interest in efforts to level
the peaks and fill in the deepest valleys of national economic activity
has mounted in recent years. Business managements, too, quite
naturally would be pleased if some practical method, free of regi-
mentation could be found to minimize swings, particularly
on the iow side. In this connection, business managements already
have given a great deal of thought to greater stabilization and what
they actually can do to achieve it.
Consideration of regularization of capital investment as a specific
policy objective, however, raises many perplexing questions in the
minds of individual-company executives. Some believe that it would
be incompatible with the operation of our profit and loss system.
Some are convinced that predominant attention to regularization of
fixed investment would soon be reflected in reduced productivity
and lost incentive to expand. This eventually would mean lower
output as well as reduced living standards across the country. There
is considerable doubt that our complex economy could be stabilized
effectively through any program to promote greater regularity in
capital investment.
When the desirability and feasibility of greater regularization of
fixed capital expenditures are carefully considered by executives
in the building materials field, several pointed conclusions almost
invariably emerge:
1. The building materials "industry"istoo heterogeneous to
permit accurate appraisal of regularization potentials (or almost
anything else). This is because of the innumerable types of products
involved in construction, the widespread use of raw materials cut-
ting across virtually all manufactures and commodities, and the
myriad of companies represented—ranging, for example, from the
marginal sawmill operator to the large-scale, diversified producer
of highly complex electronic controls.
2. Greater regularization of investment requires sooner or later
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someform of concerted action by producers and/or more govern-
ment controls.' Either of these would weaken competition, which
is absolutely indispensable to assure increasing productive efficiency
and better goods and services.
3. There can be no real assurance that in practice a determined
policy of greater regularization of capital investment actually would
lead to more economic stability. A strict regularization policy might
promote seriously disrupting short-term adjustments and introduce
considerable frustration in management planning as well. Companies
could not be expected to suddenly curtail or to sharply expand their
capital outlays whenever the. regularization objective dictated a
reversal of expenditure policy.
4. Product development, highly dependent upon scientific re-
search, cannot be timed with the precision needed to meet the
requirements implied by greater regularization of investment.
5.Capitalfor investment in new facilities is usually available only
in prosperous times. High taxes seriously limit not only what
amounts can be spent during periods of peak activity but also the
extent to which capital can be "carried over" for use in more de-
pressed times, a prerequisite to greater regularization of fixed
investment.
6. Persistent action by individual companies for greater stability
in new plant and equipment expenditures unquestionably would
reduce risk taking and in time lead to an "average" level of invest-
ment lower than that to be expected when profit is the primary
motivation.
7. Any policy intended to stabilize capital expenditures presup-
poses much more accurate forecasts of future business conditions,
including construction activity, than have been developed so far by
private business or government. Nor are such forecasts likely to
become available in the future.
1M.C. de Chazeau observes that greater regularization of fixed investment
should be considered apart from "concerted action" by industry or the "direc-
tion of some central government agency." This would be highly desirable if
indeed either or both could be avoided in developing an effective program of
greater stability in capital expenditures. For the reasons developed subsequently,
there appears at the present time to be insufficient individual-company self-
interest to lend support to a strong uncoordinated effort toward greater regu-
larization of fixed investment. The fundamental question is how much greater
regularization must be achieved to be significant. Obviously, some limited
amount can be gained voluntarily and independently, but if any noticeable
results across industry are desired, a determined program organized by private
or public interests would seem almost inescapable.
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8. Managements among the largest building materials companies
are particularly conscious of the general problem of economic sta-
bility. As a matter of policy, they continually strive to reduce wide
variationsin production and employment. Individual company
managements are making progress toward these ends by such direct
and tangible means as product diversification, careful control of
inventories, sales promotions, and production control schedules,
rather than by such indirect efforts as increased regularization of
fixed investment.
The Role of the Individual Company
Manufacturers of all types of building materials number in the tens
of thousands. While these companies are subject to the same gen-
eral economic influences, they face an infinite variety of problems,
depending upon the precise nature and end uses of their products.
Some building materials, such as cement and sheathing, enter into
the early phases of construction, while many others, such as hard-
ware and floor coverings, find use in the final building stages. Many
products, such as glass and insulation, are used outside, as well as
within, the building field.
In view of these heterogeneous conditions, almost any regulariza-
tion proposal for the "building materials industry" is likely to raise
grave doubts among producers. Their "community of interest" is far
less than is commonly supposed. To a greater extent than in many
other lines of business, survival is dependent upon management's
ability to meet challenging day-to-day developments. These involve
not only sharp variations in demand and at times intense competi-
tion, but also the inevitable dislocations that result from govern-
ment efforts to use the building industry as a contracyclical force in
the national economy.
Company executives, therefore, understandably judge such a
broad objective as regularization of fixed capital investment as
exceedingly difficult to attain at best, and particularly at the indi-
vidual-company level. Stability in capital expenditures cannot be
an end in itself for individual companies. Managements see this goal
as secondary to the vigorous pursuit of earnings, which means taking
full advantage of opportunities for profitable investment at any
time. Any other course of action, it is believed, would be a derelic-
tion of management responsibilities.
If the objective of greater regularization of fixed investment is
attainable, there is good reason to believe that eventually it cannot
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be disassociated from some form of concerted action by producers,
which would be highly undesirable for both the public and building
materials producers generally, or further government regulation of
such a far-reaching nature as to be incompatible with our system of
enterprise.
One of the most fundamental motivations behind capital invest-
ment planning by individual-company managements is the desire to
"get the jump" on competitors and above all to avoid falling behind
in market position relative to competitors. Here is a continuing
driving force found widely among executives in the companies con-
tributing to the most dynamic growth and progress in the field.
While in practice capital investments in building materials plants
generally come in waves, nevertheless individual-company manage-
ment decisions are controlling, rather than the concerted actions of
managements of companies selling in the same markets.
For competitive-market reasons, building materials producers have
always tended to make fairly simultaneous investment decisions.
This mass tendency to invest or not to invest lies at the heart of the
regularization problem of plant and equipment expenditures. Closely
related is the fact that most management decisions tend to be geared
to fairly short-run market expectations. More longer-range planning
is now being undertaken, but no fundamental change is anticipated
in management willingness to plan several years ahead so long as
the conviction persists that sharp and extended cycles in building
will recur.2
It follows that greater regularization of fixed investment among
building materials producers would require that managements of at
least the largest companies collectively "read" the economic future
almost entirely in terms of general stability or gradual growth, and
that alteration of present dominant motivations of getting or keeping
ahead of competition take place to assure that no individual firm
pursues an "independent" course of action that might touch off a
new wave of competitive capital investment expenditures. In other
2 Although many capital expenditures for the manufacture of building mate-
rials involve facilities that admittedly will remain in service for many years,
present management tendencies are to authorize such large investments almost
exclusively when short-term earnings prospects are quite favorable. Moreover,
there must be an expected opportunity to recapture the funds invested in a
comparatively few years. As Professor de Chazeau correctly states, so long as
this "short-run" investment attitude persists, the possibilities for greater regu-
larization are severely limited. Only greater confidence in long-mn business
prospects could bring about a change in management thinking along these lines.
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words, under present conditions, there seems to be little reason
to expect that greater regularization of fixed investment among
building materials producers generally could "just happen." Some
strong, and at the moment highly remote, consensus that such a
policy would be individually (and collectively) profitable would
be needed. In isolated cases, individual companies might be ex-
pected to adhere to a policy of greater regularization of fixed invest-
ment expenditures, possibly because of deep public interest or
because such a policy would be consistent with some other manage-
ment objective. But no voluntary course of action could be expected
among building materials manufacturers generally, because they
simply cannot see that it would be to their practical advantage. Nor
is it easily demonstrated that it would be, particularly in the short
run, which necessarily is of greatest concern to business manage-
ments.
Collusive efforts, of course, would be contrary to both short- and
long-term public interest because they perpetuate inefficiencies and
stifle innovations. However well intended, some suggested govern-
ment policies directed toward greater regularization of investment
by the individual firm—e.g., taxes on inventory changes and gross
investment—almost inevitably would force more industrial manage-
ment decisions into the hands of government administrators. The
recent overwhelming experience in defense controls clearly demon-
strates the serious shortcomings of further moves in this direction.
Rather clearly, such proposals also would lead to gross inequities
among individual companies. As already suggested, the "average
company" has little meaning in a field of such enormous variation
as building materials. The problems to be faced in adjusting legisla-
tive rulings to cover different growth trends among individual
companies alone would be formidable. Serious administrative com-
plications, widespread management frustrations, and dangerous
implications for our system of enterprise would seem
8Manyof the foregoing observations have been challenged by D. G. Tyndall
(see Comments, below) as based upon an "unnecessarily restricted frame of
reference." Such criticism reflects a lack of appreciation of the practical limita-
tions of applying broad government policy objectives to such a complex area
of management decision-making as capital investment. It should be pointed out
that capital investment is one of the principal areas of management responsibility
that still remain relatively free of government regulation or other direct inter-
ference, except tax legislation. Within the area of fixed investment lies the
critical spark of risk-taking and initiative, which activates our economic system.
This is no small matter, to be tampered with casually. As vitally important to
our economy as greater stability is, the need for continuing dynamic growth
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Regularization: Theory and Practice
The fragmentary data available show that capital investment by
building materials companies has followed an irregular pattern over
the years. It is far from clear, however, that in actual practice strong,
positive action by individual companies to regularize new plant and
equipment expenditures would necessarily minimize instability; or,
even if more "stability" could be achieved, that it would be worth
the eventual cost to the economy in reduced incentive to expand
and, consequently, in lowered actual as well as potential production
and living standards.
Ideally, a steadily advancing level of capital expenditures, in
balance with the needs of the economy, seems highly desirable. A
more even flow of capital investment suggests the possibility of
better company financial and budgetary control and better use of
the staff concerned with planning and executing new capital invest-
ment plans. But this ideal objective, viewed realistically, appears
virtually impossible to reach. This is simply because it has yet to be
demonstrated that regularization and "dynamic" secular growth—
essential to keeping any company competitively strong or a nation
always sufficiently powerful to resist aggression—are mutually attain-
able over any extended period of time.
It is hard to judge what criteria could be used by individual com-
panies or the industry to time investment decisions and to determine
the size of allowable expenditures under any general regularization
objective. On the one hand, no attempt might be made to draw up a
guide that individual managements could use to regularize their
investment plans. Any accomplishments toward regularization under
these circumstances would seem doubtful. On the other hand, some
guiding principles (i.e., for determining when "ceiling" or "bottom"
limits had been reached) might be developed privately or by gov-
ernment. How such principles or controls could be adapted to the
heterogeneous building materials field is obscure, to say the least.
is at least equally important. Population growth naturally assures some con-
tinued expansion of sales of building materials and virtually all other goods
and services over the years ahead. But future signfficant general advances in
living standards, as well as the ability of the nation to have both "guns and
butter" or to win another war almost certainly will depend fundamentally upon
the wisdom of capital investment decisions. It would be unfortunate indeed if
regularization—as important as it is—were pursued as a national objective to the
detriment of what is in the country's still more fundamental long-run self-
interest—dynamic growth.
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If such devices touched off abrupt changes in expenditure policies
from time to time, undoubtedly they would have highly disrupting—
rather than regularizing—effects upon individual companies and
the nation generally. "Getting under the wire" before a "ceiling"
point had been reached, "jumping the gun" at the beginning of
another period of expansion, and the need for policy exceptions to
allow uninterrupted capital outlays for "growth" products or those
deemed essential on some other grounds would all be major deter-
rents to regularization efforts.
Perhaps an even more fundamental shortcoming of attempts to
smooth the flow of capital investment would be the frustrating effect
upon managements trying to operate their businesses. Greater sta-
bility in capital outlays obviously would mean reduced expenditures
in boom periods and larger replacement-expansion expenditures in
depressed periods. No one can overlook the fact that, rightly or
wrongly, such policies are contrary to the "traditional" and "natural"
instincts and attitudes of business managements. In any field, the
prospects for mass action contrary to short-run self-interest seldom
can be considered. bright.
In many respects, more difficulty can be expected in trying to
restrain capital expenditures during upswing periods than in stimu-
lating investment at times of low activity. Among business execu-
tives, the charge of "having missed the boat" is far more serious
than having "made a common mistake" along with competitors. It is
hard to visualize many executives who, as a matter of policy, would
feel justified in foregoing or postponing capital expenditures that
offer immediate prospects of an attractive return. This would be
particularly true if there were any danger that a competitor might
step in and take advantage of the same opportunity. In other words,
the alternatives would seem to be freedom for managements to act
upon capital expenditure plans, and a fairly rigid system of con-
trolled investment. The outlook for an acceptable middle ground
position now seems rather dim.
How long any management group would be willing to forego
needed and desired capital investment outlays, under other than
emergency conditions, without losing some incentive to push through
such plans is open to question. It would seem reasonable to expect,
however, that either "voluntary" or "imposed" roadblocks to capital
investment would in time destroy part of the present strong urge to
modernize and enlarge productive facilities. To the extent that such
incentive is reduced, there would obviously be a permanent loss in
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the amount of new plant and equipment, with resultant depressing
effects upon future levels of output and consumer living standards.
Regularization Presupposes Accurate Forecasting
Not only does the restraint of capital expenditures during expanding
periods of business pose many far-reaching problems for individual-
company managements and the national economy, but there are
also serious questions to be faced in attempting to stimulate in-
creased investment when sales volumes are low. Financial stringen-
cies, abundant idle capacity, the risk of obsolescence, and the
continued expectation of still lower costs all dampen enthusiasm for
large capital outlays in depressed periods, regardless of the lessons
to be learned from history.
In a real sense, the key to well-maintained expenditures for plant
and equipment is the degree of confidence with which managements
face future sales and earnings prospects. Confidence in the future
does not require continued boom conditions, but it does imply some
fairly definite indication that any downturn will be followed by a
revival within a reasonably short period of time.
The timing of cyclical movements obviously is crucial to invest-
ment planning. A "few" years or "several" months may seem in-
significant periods to the general economic analyst studying the
national problem of instability at long range, but these same periods
tend to be "long" for most managements. This difference in view-
point is apparent when it is realized that most building materials
companies would exhaust their liquid assets in three months or less
in the face of a deep sales decline; similarly, maintenance of full
payrolls without any sales income at all would force liquidation of
most company assets in eighteen to thirty months.
Under these circumstances, most building materials managements
necessarily keep their eye on short-run developments, especially
current and near-term earnings. While producers make some efforts
to plan capital investments on the basis of longer-run expectations,
they recognize that an error in timing judgment could prove
disastrous.
To regularize capital expenditures in any precise sense obviously
would require quite accurate forecasts of future sales demand, and
also sufficient management experience with such 'reliable" fore-
casts as to warrant their wholehearted use in planning new plant
and equipment expenditures. Neither condition seems likely in the
foreseeable future.
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Individual company managements, of course, make and use their
own forecasts of future trends, but the explicit purpose of such
forecasts is to permit prompt and informative decisions on pending
matters. It is not likely that managements will wait—in the interest
of capital investment regularization—for either building or general
business activity to slow down or to improve before they decide to
act on a proposed expenditure program. For the present at least,
building materials managements would not feel justified in linking
detailed investment plans as rigidly to forecasts of the uncertain
longer-run future as regularization would seem to require. There
would be particularly strong resistance to any efforts to tie invest-
ment decisions, voluntarily or otherwise, to forecasts made outside
the company, and especially those influenced or dictated by com-
petitors or government officials.
Some Uncontrollable influences upon Capital Expenditures
Capital outlays tend to fluctuate above the bare minimum of annual
depreciation allowances, especially with today's exceedingly high
replacement costs. Expenditures for expansion purposes usually are
linked closely to such questions as: Is existing capacity adequate to
meet definitely foreseeable demands? Is there an opportunity for
greater production efliciency? Can product improvements or new
products be introduced? Should facilities of other companies be
acquired?
Because the answers to these questions vary sharply from time
to time, capital expenditures often are not readily predictable, by
managements or anyone else, even within fairly broad time limits.
First, managements have relatively little control over the timing of
research developments. Only sheer duplication of existing facilities,
not a typical situation, would eliminate the need for research to
precede a capital investment program. Research directors are con-
stantly under pressure from managements to set deadlines for com-
pletion of specific projects, but such predictions necessarily are
subject to wide ranges of error. From a capital investment stand-
point, the critical need is to try to foresee when a research develop-
ment will reach the stage preparatory to full-scale factory operation.
In the building materials field, numerous research discoveries have
occurred well ahead ofschedule,forcing a sharp acceleration in
capital expenditure programs. Similarly, failures of "promising" pilot-
scale developments to meet performance tests for mass production
and general market acceptance have delayed capital expenditures.
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Second, the availability of capital often is an important deterrent
to precise timing of actual plant and equipment expenditures. Post-
war developments in the capital markets have forced managements
to rely increasingly upon internal sources of funds, with the result
that current earnings directly influence to a very large degree the
level of capital expenditures. In other words, managements are now
heavily dependent upon prosperous times for capital, a situation that
obviously works against any policy of regularization of capital in-
vestment. This is particularly true in view of present high tax rates,
which, in combination with inflated costs of capital goods, leave
relatively little capital for potential use during periods of low
activity.
Third, under semi-war conditions highly uncertain supplies of
materials and shifting market outlets, which are directly attributable
to government policies and foreign restrictions, also may change
management plans for the timing and amount of capital expendi-
tures. Not only do shortages of machinery and materials from time
to time delay many specific projects, but also they may create
entirely new capital expenditure projects to produce substitute
products.
Fourth, there are capital investment programs which become
necessary because of unexpected competitive developments or
market trends. Such market "surprises" may reflect either previous
errors in management judgment or simply strikingly new develop-
ments. Whatever the cause, they call for speedy action and new
capital investments by alert managements anxious to offset their
market disadvantages at the earliest possible moment.
Management Efforts to Reduce Economic Instability
The foregoing analysis has pointed out a number of serious short-
comings in any program of action intended to increase the regu-
larization of capital investment by building materials manufacturers.
It should not be inferred from what has been said, however, that
building materials managements are neither willing nor able to take
positive steps to promote greater stability. The record is clearly to
the contrary.
To some extent, "stabilization" as a broad objective accompanies
mature growth in industry as well as in many individuals. When a
business organization obtains an established position in any industry,
there is the almost instinctive minimum desire to maintain that
position as well as the confidence of the individuals, financial insti-
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tutions, and others that have assisted the company over the years.
It is not surprising, therefore, that larger, well-established companies
tend to show greater willingness to assume responsibility for stability
in employment and general operations than smaller organizations.
While a determined policy of regularization of new plant and
equipment expenditures appears to many building materials execu-
tives to be an impractical, indirect, and potentially dangerous
method of lessening variations in economic activity, several other
more direct means seem more fruitful: careful planning of produc-
tion schedules, flexible inventory policies,sales and promotion
policies readily adaptable to changes in demand, cost reduction
budgeting, product diversification, and a continuing appraisal of
future prospects to reduce the need for sudden changes in key
policy matters.
Building materials producers have made considerable progress in
recent years in over-all production control, so that raw materials,
productive capacity, manpower, output rates, and shipments are
coordinated to minimize shutdowns as well as intermittent periods
of overtime. Such careful scheduling obviously has the advantage of
promoting steadier employment and payrolls, and is much more
economical than the earlier methods of planning operations on a
hand-to-mouth basis from incoming orders.
Inventories play an important part in any program of stabilization
at the company level. Although the bulkiness of many building
materials limits the size of stocks that can be carried, inventories can
be used to "cushion" the effect of sharp variations in orders for
seasonal or other reasons.
The Armstrong Cork Company for many years has recognized
that sales to distributors are really not "final" sales. Only when the
ultimate customer purchases and pays for the goods can the sales
be considered final. As a result, it has long been a management
policy to watch very carefully inventories of Armstrong products in
the hands of distributors in order to gear production schedules to
"final" rather than "intermediate" sales. These developing policies
and practices, requiring close cooperation throughout distribution
and production channels, took many years to build up the necessary
understanding and confidence as well as the data-collection system
upon which the program rests.
Experience has shown that an individual company can influence,
at times markedly, the demand for its products by well-timed and
vigorous sales promotions. Constant attention to sales trends and
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prospects, buiwarked by well-planned advertising and promotion
programs ready for use, unquestionably helps stabilize production
and employment within an individual company, and thus contributes
to general stability as well.
Every well-managed organization, particularly under keenly com-
petitive selling conditions, continually searches for ways to reduce
costs in order to strengthen its position in the market and thus to
lessen the .impact of sharp cutbacks in its operations. Some finns,
such as the Annstrong Cork Company, plan for cost reductions on a
budget basis. This management device requires that stipulated,
reasonable amounts of cost reductions be achieved by production
and allied personnel during the budget period. Since the ranking
production executive is in charge of cost reduction work, he assumes
general responsibility for a never-ending appraisal of the savings
that can be made by replacement and modernization of existing
facilities.
The increasing diversity of manufactures within companies across
American industry, and particularly in the field of building mate-
rials, is direct evidence of management efforts to stabilize over-all
company operations. The severe variations in demand for building
materials over the years have led to extensive diversification of
products among many individual companies, clouding still further
any meaning that might be attached to the "building materials
industry." While admittedly the addition of new, less cyclically and
seasonally vulnerable products to a company line cannot be expected
to alter the variability of demand for individual building material
items, the expected end result is more stabilized operations for the
whole company. As a specific illustration, the Armstrong Cork Com-
pany entered the glass business and enlarged its closure-making
capacity in the late 1930's to reduce its total corporate exposure to
the wide variations in sales of products having a primary end use
in construction.
So long as the profit incentive remains strong, it can be expected
that aggressive managements will seek opportunities for gain by
carrying out plans to improve products, develop new ones, enter
new fields, and in general accept calculated risks as pioneers in a
wide variety of markets. The resultant benefits to the public are
obvious. The almost instinctive desire, for example, to "buy low" in
order to "sell high" or to "get the jump on competition" places a
great premium on advance planning because of tangible prospects
of profit. By contrast, planning on the basis of regularization of
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capital investment would introduce the further uncertainty of an
interim waiting period. This would take the form either of a post-
ponement of a desired expenditure that otherwise could be expected
to net an immediate profit, or a calculated "postponement" of a
desired profit by making a capital expenditure when the level of
demand does not require the outlay for new manufacturing facilities.
The Outlook
Undoubtedly recent record boom years have influenced general
thinking on the matter of economic stabilization to the point where
the problem of deflation seems somewhat less acute to many people
than it did during the 1930's or at the close of World War IL
Certainly, other problems have attracted more immediate attention
among building materials managements during the past few years.
There is no conviction, however, that the "building cycle" has dis-
appeared.
Currently building materials executives are becoming increasingly
concerned over sales prospects. There also looms the possibility of a
further, more severe adjustment (e.g., in 1954-1956) whenever the
national boom in defense and capital expenditures begins to taper
off noticeably. If these weaknesses appear, building materials man-
agements will undoubtedly make full use of the methods just
outlined to stimulate their sales and production.
There is now some preliminary evidence of planning of capital
outlays to be undertaken in anticipation of the next cyclical upswing
in demand following the widely expected intervening period of
decline ahead if all-out war is avoided. The almost certain upsurge
in family formations later in this decade and in the early 1960's,
because of very high birth rates since 1940, provides a more definite
basis for longer-range planning of fixed investment than we have
had at any time in several decades. Consequently, the prospects now
are for somewhat greater regularization of capital expenditures
among building materials manufacturers in the years ahead, regard-
less of the success of any general program in bringing about more
stability in such outlays on some other grounds.4 Basic thinking
4ifactually achieved, such regularization will be the result of decisions of
managements of individual companies acting in their own self-interest. This
obviously will be the ideal situation that Professor de Chazeau visualizes. It
should be fully recognized, however, that to the extent that greater regulariza-
tion occurs, it will be the result of a basic change in the economic environment
and not in the attitudes of business managements making capital expenditures.
129BUILDING MATERIALS INDUSTRY
among building materials managements, however,stillstresses
"offsetting" or "making the best" of the seemingly inevitable cyclical
variations in construction and business, rather than action to achieve
greater economic stabilization by such indirect means as regulariza-
tion of capital investment.
Individual-company managements deem their decisions too in-
significant, and national stability too dependent upon many variables
more complex than capital expenditures, to devote more than sec-
ondary attention to such indirect stabilizing factors as regularization
of capital investment. There is firm conviction that the future of an
individual company as well as the national economy will continue
to be promising so long as incentive—to produce, to take risks, and
to expand—is preserved. If the principal objective of public and
private action becomes stabilization, the outlook would seem to be
far less promising.
In some respects the future alternatives may be these: a some-
what irregular upward trend, with real opportunities for individual
company gains along the way; versus a more regular pattern of
activity averaging at a lower level, with reduced incentive and more
limitations on freedom for even the most prudent action. If so, it is
not to foretell which alternative building materials execu-
tives would favor.
COMMENT
DAvm GoiwoN TYNDALL, American President Lines
Mr. Hoadley makes a strong case for his conclusion that greater
regularization of business investment "would soon be reflected in
reduced productivity and lost incentive to expand." It should be
emphasized, however, that his conclusion is valid only within the
unnecessarily restricted frame of reference which he employs, a
frame of reference that would exclude many of the proposals put
forward later by Professor Hart. It is not true of many of these
proposals (e.g., a tax on inventory changes, or a tax on gross invest-
ment) that they would weaken competition. On the contrary, were
such proposals moderately effective in reducing cyclical instability,
many of the strongest pressures now forcing businesses into non-
Hence, there is no reason to alter the views presented at the outset, namely, that
regularization per se cannot be a primary objective of managements among
building materials companies.
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competitive lines of action would be greatly weakened. Nor would
the results of such proposals be to reduce average investment over
the cycle. Only if greater stability reduced the need for large
amounts of capacity that, though required for peak operations,
would lie idle for most of its useful life, would investment fall off.
Such a reduction would be desirable, but, in any case, it would
almost certainly be outweighed by the increased demand for invest-
ment goods due to the greater total output over the cycle. Regu-
larization of business investment induced by collusive action of
business or by detailed direct controls of government might well
have the effects which Hoadley envisages, but there are other
alternatives which would not produce such effects.
181